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7 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT: Junior Officers' Committee Report on "Reasons for Low Morale Among Junior Officers."

1. I have read the referenced report and found it interesting and worth study. Many of the points set out in this report are just good organization and management procedures; some have been emphasized by reports of investigations and reviews made by the Inspection and Review Staff during the past year.

2. The following specific comments may be of interest to the Chief of Operations, DD/P, and to the Inspector General:

A. Recruitment and Placement.

(i) The Junior Officers feel that the recruiters give a false impression to prospective employees. This has been an Agency-wide complaint for a long time.

(ii) Almost every supervisor in the Agency is acquainted with the college girl who has majored in dramatic arts, who has had a very, very brief, if any, course in business school and who is hired as a secretary. I feel strongly that the best place to recruit secretarial and clerical personnel is a business college or at institutions which train people over an extended period of time to do secretarial and/or clerical work.

(iii) The Junior Officers feel the Agency has gone overboard in recruiting college graduates and then placing them in "temporary" slots as messengers, clerks, etc. I disagree with the committee's view that college graduates should not be hired as clerks, and messengers; I feel college graduates should be recruited as clerks, if willing to accept such employment; but that the Unit Chief and all people responsible for the recruitment should make it unmistakably clear to the prospective employee that he or she is being recruited as a clerk, or messenger, and not as an officer or supervisor.

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- 2 -

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B. Rotation and Reassignment.

(i) The Junior Officer's Committee apparently feels this subject is one of the larger morale problems. They claim to have dozens of documented cases indicating almost no realistic planning for rotations between the field and headquarters. They say the existing machinery is not thorough enough.

(ii) I agree that the existing machinery is not yet thorough enough. There are many people who want and need (for the proper development of their careers) to go overseas who are unable to get placed in overseas slots. Too, the Agency is still so young that there are too many people in positions of responsibility at headquarters who have had no overseas experience. This will likely be corrected with time.

(iii) I believe it would be wise for the Agency to arrive eventually at a three category breakdown of civilian staff personnel: (a) Career, (b) Professional (Contractual), and (c) Clerical. There is no doubt that the Agency will continue to need to call on especially qualified people for "short periods" to work as staff members. These persons should be given contracts and not considered "career". The "short periods" could run for several years with appropriate renewals of contracts.

(iv) I also believe it should be necessary for any person to have served a minimum of three (3) years and to have had a thorough screening and a review and evaluation of his performance during that three (3) years before he has been accepted as a "career" employee. During these first three (3) years each employee should be on a contractual basis.

(v) I do not believe CIA can promise or justify every employee who gets his name on the rolls a career in the Agency. "Selections out" must be made if the quality of personnel is to become and remain sufficiently high to do CIA's job.

C. Supervision.

(i) The majority of persons interviewed by the Junior Officer's Committee apparently felt an absence of clear-cut supervision. They felt there was insufficient direct contact between supervisors and Junior Employees.

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- 3 -

(ii) This is too frequently the exact situation in the Clandestine Services.

(iii) I believe a contributing factor to this lack of supervision has been the failure to tag the supervisor with the responsibility for the acts and performances of his subordinates.

D. Pay and Promotion:

(i) The Committee's report noted a lack of consistent policy in the Agency on both pay and promotions.

(ii) Unfortunately, their statements concerning this lack of uniformity are correct. However, the Career Service Boards should go far towards correcting this; and these Boards, together with a stop on recruiting and a trimming down to a smaller group, should materially decrease such inequities in the Clandestine Services.

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E. Security.

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F. Training

(i) Among other things, this report states that there is no follow-up to introductory language courses except self-study which is insufficient to maintain the students proficiency.


(ii) It is my contention that this Agency should adopt a policy similar to that which the FBI had for language training in which each employee who is studying a language at government expense be given

- 4 -

tests and that the grades on these tests be considered in assignments and promotions. I have known the Agency to waste money for language courses for employees.

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G. Efficient Use of Monies.



(iv) I believe tremendous improvements are being made in this regard.

H. Military Credit.

(i) The report states that military credit should be given to those employees who have had Agency experience comparable to military experience.

(ii) I feel that the Agency cannot, in any sense, be a haven for "draft dodgers" and I do not believe any young men who are eligible for military service should be granted exceptions as a result of work for this Agency. If the Agency desires a particular young man, he can be assigned after he has been drafted, and questions of exemption from the draft should not, at any time, be considered by the Agency in the present state of world affairs.


I. Intangibles

(i) Under this heading the committee discussed various matters

- 5 -

such as influence commensurate with job, etc. Some employees felt that there were failures to point up CIA's mission sufficiently and to build up CIA's prestige in government circles.

I feel that the employee who needs outside influence or prestige commensurate with his job in CIA does not have the love for anonymity which is so necessary in intelligence work.



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Chief, Inspection and Review

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